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A dynamic process underlying ﬁrms’ discrete ﬁnancial choices has pre-
viously been found, but without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity,
this dependence can either be of a ”true” nature or an eﬀect of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
characteristics that we cannot observe. This study extends previous re-
search focusing on ﬁrms’ discrete external ﬁnancing decision by adapting
a model by Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000), which accommodates both
ﬁxed eﬀects and a lagged dependent variable, which makes it possible to
establish the nature of the dependence. We ﬁnd that there is a smoothing
of ﬁnancing, even after controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, and also
that unobserved heterogeneity plays a signiﬁcant explanatory role.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is often observed that an individual that has experienced an event in the
past is more likely to do so again. One explanation is that experiencing an
event alters the relevant preferences, costs or constraints, i.e. ”true state de-
pendence”. Another explanation is that individuals diﬀer in certain permanent
unmeasured variables that inﬂuence their probability of experiencing the event,
i.e. ”spurious state dependence”. This point was originally brought forward by
Heckman (1981b). Distinguishing between these two explanations is important.
In the former case, the experience has a genuine behavioral eﬀect, while in the
latter, the previous experience seems to be a determinant of future experience
solely because of it being a proxy for temporally persistent unobservable factors
that determine choices. Hence, a proper test for dependence should control for
unobserved individual-speciﬁce ﬀects.
Empirical studies on ﬁrms’ discrete ﬁnancial choices are usually static [e.g.
Marsh (1982), MacKie-Mason (1990), Jung et al. (1996)]. Exceptions are Hel-
wege and Liang (19 9 6 ) ,w h o ,h o w e v e r ,d on o tc o n t r o lf o ri n d i v i d u a ls p e c i ﬁce f -
fects, and Corres et al (1997), who use random eﬀects to control for unobserved
heterogeneity. Helwege and Liang ﬁnd that ﬁrms that previously acquired ex-
ternal ﬁnancing are more likely to do so again. Also, De Haan and Hinloopen
(1999), who follow the approach of Helwege and Liang for a sample of Dutch
ﬁrms, ﬁnd evidence of the same behavior. But neither of these studies considers
unobserved heterogeneity. This makes it impossible to conclude whether the
2persistence is of a ”true” nature.
If there are large costs associated with acquiring external capital, ﬁrms
should tend to raise excess funds when entering capital markets to avoid the
need of doing so again in the near future. On the other hand, external ﬁnanc-
ing can be associated with positive side eﬀects. If ﬁrms repeatedly are in the
market for new capital, the monitoring cost can be reduced when the suppliers
of the ”new” capital monitor the ﬁrm’s management. Additionally, long-term
relationships between borrowers and lenders can lower the cost of asymmetric
information, which make debt ﬁnancing less costly for ﬁrms that have gained
a good reputation on the capital markets. Also, a number of empirical studies
show that ﬁrms that frequently issue equity can do so to a lower cost. Smith
(1986) suggests that the market reaction is a function of the predictability of the
issue, and, hence, frequent equity issuers cause a less negative market reaction
than those who seldom issue equity [see McDaniel et al (1994), Bayless (1994),
and Jung et al (1996)].
This study focus on the discrete external ﬁnancing choice, as Helwege and
Liang (1996), and Belt and Klein (1993), and extends these by controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity. The discrete choice model of Honoré and Kyriazidou
(2000), makes it possible in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity to investi-
gate the external ﬁnancing choice in a dynamic setting, since it accommodates
both a lagged dependent variable and ﬁxed eﬀects. We extend the existing lit-
erature on discrete ﬁnancial choices by considering both a dynamic structure,
3and unobserved heterogeneity when allowing the unobserved individual-speciﬁc
eﬀects to be correlated with other explanatory variables, i.e. treating the indi-
vidual eﬀects as ﬁxed. In accordance with previous studies, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms
that previously acquired external ﬁnancing are more likely to do so again. How-
ever, neglecting unobserved heterogeneity overstates the economic importance
of the lagged choice in the sense of ”spurious state dependence”. After con-
trolling for unobserved heterogeneity, ﬁrms that acquired external capital in the
previous period are approximately 8 percentage points more likely to acquire ex-
ternal ﬁnancing than ﬁrms that did not acquire external capital in the previous
period.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe diﬀerent ex-
planations for persistence in ﬁrms’ external ﬁnancing choice. In section 3,w e
deﬁne the explanatory variables. The diﬀerent econometric estimators used are
discussed in section 4, followed by a description of data in section 5.I n sec-
tion 6, the results are reported, and, ﬁnally, section 7 oﬀers some concluding
remarks.
42 Internal or External funds?
Understanding processes underlying ﬁrms’ discrete ﬁnancial choices is impor-
tant, especially since ﬁrms play a signiﬁcant role in the ﬁnancial markets. By
acquiring external ﬁnancing, ﬁrms obtain ﬁnancing for future investments. Al-
ternatively, by having large operating cash ﬂows or by adapting a low dividend
payout policy, ﬁrms can to a larger extent rely on internally generated funds. It
is also possible that ﬁrms restrict dividends, in periods when operational cash
ﬂow are large, to build up ﬁnancial slack in form of working capital.
If internal and external capital were perfect substitutes, ﬁnancial factors
would be irrelevant to investments. If not, investments can depend on the
availability of internal ﬁnance, access to new debt or equity ﬁnancing. Since
managers know more than investors about investment opportunities and their
proﬁtability, a plausible assumption is that this information asymmetry aﬀects
the choice between external and internal ﬁnancing. If so, the cost of an ad-
ditional unit of external ﬁnance will exceed the opportunity cost of internally
retained funds. This wedge causes underinvestment by ﬁrms that lack internal
funds
In a sample of US ﬁrms that went public in 1984, Helwege and Liang (1996)
investigate if the pecking order theory can explain why external capital is ac-
quired. They include an indicator variable for ﬁrms that raised funds externally
in the previous year. If there are large ﬁxed costs associated with acquiring
external capital, ﬁrms should tend to raise excess funds when entering capital
5markets. Helwege and Liang argue that if ﬁrms raise excess funds to avoid
costs of having to raise funds again in the near future, then the previous ﬁnanc-
ing variable will have a signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient. However, Helwege and
Liang´s result implies a signiﬁcant positive relationship between the previous
ﬁnancing variable and the possibility of external funds, i.e. ﬁrms that once have
acquired external funds are more likely to do so again. De Haan and Hinloopen
(1999) also ﬁnd this positive relationship. They suggest that it indicates some
”learning eﬀect”, i.e. ﬁrms that have a positive experience when acquiring ex-
ternal funds can be more inclined to use external ﬁnance than ﬁrms that do not
have this experience.
In order to explain ﬁrms’ behavior, the quest is to ﬁnd theoretical arguments
and empirical ﬁndings for why a ”learning eﬀect” exists. Also, one must examine
whether this persistence is an eﬀect of unobserved heterogeneity or of a ”true”
nature. Following arguments support persistence in ﬁrms’ external ﬁnancing
choice.
For public issues: The empirical evidence for a negative market reaction to
the announcement of equity issue is solid [ e.g. Denis (1994), Masulis and Korwar
(1986), Asquith and Mullins (1986)] and, also, the observed price reduction at
the equity issue announcement is positively related to the ﬁrm-speciﬁca m o u n t
of asymmetric information [e.g. Dierkens (1991)]. A similar, but not as large,
negative price eﬀect is also observed for public debt announcement [Manuel
et al (1993)]. Studies of frequent and non-frequent equity issuers show that
6the announcement eﬀect of equity issuance from frequent issuers cause a less
negative market reaction than from those who seldom issue equity. Smith (1986)
suggests that the market reaction is a function of the predictability of the issue.
Thus, ﬁrms that frequently issue equity can do so to a lower cost in terms of a
smaller price reduction of their shares outstanding [see McDaniel et al (1994),
Bayless (1994), and Jung et al (1996)].
For private debt: Diamond (1989) argues that a long-term relationship be-
tween borrowers and lenders lower the cost of asymmetric information. Recent
work at Sveriges Riksbank suggests that good relations with a bank increase the
possibility that a ﬁrm will obtain a loan. Continuing relationships can entail
lower costs for lenders that make a series of loans to the same borrower [see
Daltung and Nedersjö (1997)]. Also, Easterbrook (1984) argues that external
ﬁnancing can be associated with positive side eﬀects. By obtaining external
ﬁnancing, the suppliers of the ”new” capital monitor the ﬁrm’s management
and the shareholders’ monitoring cost is reduced if ﬁrms constantly are in the
market for new capital.
73 Explanatory variables
The econometric model by Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000) makes it possible to
include additional regressors other than the lagged dependent variable. When
doing so, we follow previous studies, which makes it possible to investigate one of
the implications of the pecking order theory, as described by Myers (1984). The
pecking order theory implies that ﬁrms obtain external ﬁnancing only when
internal funds are not suﬃcient to ﬁnance investment projects. To test the
pecking order theory, Helwege and Liang (1996) estimate a logit model to predict
external ﬁnancing. If internal ﬁnancing are preferred, the amount of available
funds should aﬀect the decision to acquire external ﬁnancing, e.g. an increase in
the cash deﬁcit should increase the likelihood of external ﬁnance. Variables for
cash deﬁcit or funds ﬂow deﬁcit has previously been used by Auerbach (1985),
MacKie-Mason (1990), and Myers and Shyam-Sunder (1999).
When an imbalance between operating earnings and committed investments
and dividends occur, the ﬁrm chooses between either acquiring external ﬁnance
or reducing the stock of working capital. According to the pecking order theory,
the ﬁrm should, if possible, avoid external ﬁnancing. A larger deﬁcit makes it
more probable, for any given level of the stock of working capital, that the ﬁrm
must acquire external capital. We follow Helwege and Liang (1996) and deﬁne
the expected cash deﬁcit (DEF) as the sum of investments net of sold physical
assets and dividend payments less operating earnings before depreciation. To
avoid simultaneity, all variables that can be characterized as decision variables,
8i.e. dividends and investments, are measured for the year prior to the ﬁnancing
decision. The cash deﬁcit is denominated with total assets, which are measured
in the beginning of the period since total assets are contaminated by the eﬀects
of the external ﬁnancing decision.
The stock of working capital (WC) measures the amount of ﬁnancial slack.
De Haan and Hinloopen (1999) measure ﬁnancial slack as the proportion of
liquid assets on the balance sheet. However, we choose to use the stock of
working capital, i.e. current assets net of short-term debt. An advantage is
that the stock of working capital relates liquid assets to short-term debt, which
gives a better picture of the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. If ﬁrms with larger
amount of ﬁnancial slack are less likely to raise external ﬁnance it favors the
hypothesis that internal ﬁnancing is preferred, i.e. ﬁrms with a larger stock of
working capital are further away from the critical point, where external ﬁnancing
becomes unavoidable. Working capital is denominated with total assets, and is
measured in the beginning of the period for two reasons. First, working capital
can be characterized as a decision variable. Secondly, if ﬁrms raise excess funds
when acquiring external capital, the stock of working capital is likely to be
contaminated by the external ﬁnancing decision.
We also include sales growth (SALGR). Firms with a higher growth in sales
can be more likely to acquire external capital for any given level of expected
deﬁc i t ,s i n c et h e yh a v em o r eﬂeeting investment opportunities, and therefore a
larger demand for capital. To capture any possible size eﬀect we also include
9ﬁrm’s size (SIZE) measured as the log of total assets in the beginning of the
period. Since the cash deﬁcit is denominated with total assets, large ﬁrms
can have small deﬁcits that nevertheless are large sums of money. These ﬁrms
are expected to ﬁnance these deﬁcits externally, despite the deﬁcits’ small size
relative to total assets.
We deﬁne the external ﬁnancing variable (EXT) following Helwege and
Liang (1996). The dependent variable, external ﬁnance, is equal to one if a
ﬁrm either issues public equity or if its long term debt stock has grown with
at least 10 percent, and equal to zero otherwise. We deﬁne the long-term debt
stock by excluding pension liabilities. Helwege and Liang (1996) include an
indicator variable for ﬁrms that raised funds externally in the previous year.
Previous ﬁnancing (EXTt−1) is an indicator variable which takes the value of
one if external ﬁnance was acquired in the previous period, and the value of
zero otherwise.
Table 1. Expected sign, explanatory variables
DEF expected cash deﬁcit +
SALGR sales growth +
WC working capital −
SIZE log of total assets +
EXTit−1 lagged choice +/−
If the costs for receiving external funds are less for ﬁrms that more frequently
are in the market for external capital, a positive coeﬃcient for the lagged depen-
10dent variable is expected. On the other hand, substantial costs associated with
external ﬁnancing should make external ﬁnancing an isolated phenomenon, and
we should expect a negative sign. If the previous external ﬁnancing decision
is of importance for ﬁrms when deciding whether or not to acquire external
capital, we should recognize this as true state dependence. But to correctly
control if the nature of the dependence is of a ”true” nature, or an eﬀect of ﬁrm
characteristic that we can not observe, we must have a dynamic discrete model
with ﬁxed eﬀects. In the next section, we discuss the discrete choice model of
Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000), which accommodates both a lagged dependent
variable and ﬁxed eﬀects.
4E c o n o m e t r i c s p e c i ﬁcation
As was noted in the introduction, it is often observed that an individual that has
experienced an event in the past is more likely to do so again. However, as Heck-
man (1981b) brought forward, distinguishing between ”true dependence” and
”spurious state dependence” is important. In the case of ”true dependence”, the
experience has a genuine behavioral eﬀect, while in the case of ”spurious state
dependence”, the previous experience appears to be a determinant of future
experience solely because it is a proxy for temporally persistent unobservable
factors that determine choices. Hence, a proper test for dependence should
control for unobserved individual-speciﬁce ﬀects.
11In this paper, the importance of unobserved heterogeneity and a dynamic
structure in the ﬁrm’s external ﬁnancing choice will be investigated by estimat-
ing the probability of external ﬁnance using ﬁve diﬀerent estimation methods.
The ﬁve methods are:
ML: Static model, no unobserved heterogeneity.
P (yit =1 )=F(xitβ)
MLL: Dynamic model, no unobserved heterogeneity.
P (yit =1 )=F(xitβ + γyit−1)
CL: Static model, unobserved heterogeneity.
P(yit =1 )=F (xitβ + αi)
CLL: Dynamic model, unobserved heterogeneity, Conditional likelihood.
P (yit =1 )=F(xitβ + γyit−1 + αi)CL
HK: Dynamic model, unobserved heterogeneity, Honoré and Kyriazidou.
P (yit =1 )=F(xitβ + γyit−1 + αi)
where F (.) is a logistic cumulative distribution function.
Model ML and MLL are estimated with the maximum likelihood estimator.
These models assume homogeneity; i.e. the unobserved individual diﬀerences
are treated as random events. Belt and Klein (1993) use Model ML, and both
Helwege and Liang (1996) and De Haan and Hinloopen (1999) use model MLL,
when estimating the likelihood of external ﬁnancing.
Unlike in the cross-sectional models, maximum likelihood estimates are in-
consistent in ﬁxed eﬀects’ panel data models, since, for a ﬁxed T,t h en u m b e r
of parameters αi increases with N.T h i si m p l i e st h a tαi cannot be consistently
12estimated for a ﬁxed T. However, if T →∞ , then maximum likelihood of αi
and β are possible. In absence of dynamic feedback from the lagged choice,
Chamberlain (1980) suggested a conditional likelihood approach, Model CL, to
estimate panel data logit models with ﬁxed eﬀect of the form
P(yi0 =1 |xi,αi)=po(xi,αi) (1)
P(yit =1 |xi,αi)=
exp(xitβ + αi)
1+e x p (xitβ + αi)
t =1 ,...,T;T ≥ 2 (2)
where β is the parameter of interest, αi is an individual-speciﬁce ﬀect which
may depend on the exogenous explanatory variables xi =( xi1,...,xiT), and
where yi0 may or may not be observed.
When using ﬁxed eﬀects, parameters for time-invariant variables cannot be
estimated, since αi captures these eﬀects. Inference concerning β is based on
the conditional probability of a particular history of choices between 0 and 1 is
dependent of αi, given the total number of times that the individual has chosen
1,
P
t yit, and given that there is at least one switch between the two alternatives.
If
P
t yit =0or T, these groups contribute zero to the likelihood function and
are discarded. Consider the case where T =2 , then the only relevant case is




1+e x p ( xi1β + αi)
×
exp(xi2β + αi)




1+e x p ( xi1β + αi)
×
1
1+e x p (xi2β + αi)
(4)
Thus, the conditional probability is





1+e x p [ ( xi2 − xi1)β]
(5)
The αi´s have been eliminated and β may be estimated by maximizing the
conditional likelihood function.
The conditional likelihood approach can also be used to estimate panel data
logit models where the lagged dependent variable is the only explanatory vari-
able, provided that there exists at least four observation per individual. A prob-
lem is that the model does not permit the use of exogenous variables. All it tells
is whether yt depends on yt−1. When including other explanatory variables, as
in model CLL above, the residual in time period t will not be independent of the
explanatory variables in time period t − 1, resulting in biased and inconsistent
estimates, [see, e.g. Arellano and Honoré (1999)].
Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000) demonstrated that identiﬁcation of the dy-
namic logit is feasible if the econometrician has access to four or more obser-
vations per individual, when the additional explanatory variables are strictly
exogenous. The unobserved individual-speciﬁce ﬀects may be correlated with
14t h eo b s e r v e dc o v a r i a t e si na nu n s p e c i ﬁed way. Their suggested estimators
are consistent and asymptotically normal, provided that the errors are i.i.d.
and logistically distributed. We will describe the identiﬁcation strategy for
T =3 . Consider the events A≡{yi0=di0,y i1 =0 ,y i2 =1 ,y i3 = di3},a n d
B≡{yi0=di0,y i1 =1 ,y i2 =0 ,y i3 = di3} where di0 and di3 are either 0 or 1.
Here conditioning only on the suﬃciency class, i.e.
PT
t=1 yit, will not eliminate
the individual eﬀects.
In general P(A|xi,αi,A∪ B) will depend on αi,w h i c hi st h er e a s o nw h y
a conditional likelihood approach will not eliminate the ﬁxed eﬀect. However,
Honoré ´and Kyriazidou show that the individual eﬀects can be eliminated and
the parameters are identiﬁed if xi2 = xi3.T h e n
P(A|xi,αi,A∪ B,xi2 = xi3)=
1
1+e x p ( ( xi1 − xi2)β + γ(di0 − di3))
(6)
P(B|xi,αi,A∪ B,xi2 = xi3)=
exp((xi1 − xi2)β + γ(di0 − di3))
1+e x p ( ( xi1 − xi2)β + γ(di0 − di3))
(7)
which does not depend on αi.
If the continuous variables in xi2 − xi3 have a power density at 0, one can
derive an estimator, which puts increasing weights on observation for which xi2
is close to xi3. Honoré and Kyriazidou propose for the binary choice model, in













exp((xit − xis)β + γ(dit−1 − dis+1)+γ(dit+1 − dis−1)1{s − t>1})dit
1+e x p ( ( xit − xis)β + γ(dit−1 − dis+1)+γ(dit+1 − dis−1)1{s − t>1})
¶
where K(.) is a kernel density function which gives the appropriate weight to
observation i, i.e. more weight to observations with smaller diﬀerences, and hn
is a bandwidth which shrinks as n increases. The estimator will have a slower
rate of convergence than n− 1
2. Also, as the number of continuous exogenous
regressors increases, the rate of convergence will be slower.1
A major limitation of their approach is the assumption that xit−xis has sup-
port in a neighborhood of 0 for any t 6= s, which rules out time-dummies as ex-
planatory variables.2 An advantage is that, in contrast to other likelihood-based
approaches, the Honoré and Kyriazidou approach does not require modeling of
the initial observation of the sample. Further, it does not make any assump-
tion about the statistical relationship of the individual eﬀects with the observed
covariates, or with the initial conditions, [Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000)].
1A suggested bandwidth form is hn = h × n
− 1
2∗s+k ,w h e r eh is the bandwidth constant,
k is the number of exogenous continuous regressors, and s is the number of times that the
kernel density function is continuously diﬀerentiable on its support. For a normal density, s
is equal to 2. See Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000) for further details.
2Chintagunta et al (1998) also mention the following limitations: First, the assumption that
the errors in the underlying threshold-crossing model are independent over time. Secondly,
since individual unobservable eﬀe c tc a nn o tb ee s t i m a t e di ti sn o tp o s s i b l et oc a r r yo u to r
compute elasticities for individual agents or at speciﬁed values of the explanatory variables.
However, it is possible to calculate elasticities for the observed sample population.
16Table 2. Summary of econometric models
Model ML MLL CL CLL HK
Heterogeneity No No Yes Yes Yes
Lagged dependent variable No Yes No Yes Yes
Consistent Yes Yes Yes No Yes
A Monte Carlo study performed by Chintagunta et al (1998) shows that the
conditional logit methods, CL and CLL, give a smaller average bias of the exoge-
nous variables than the Honoré and Kyriazidou estimator. CLL gives smaller
average biases for all the exogenous variables. On the other hand, the CLL
estimator performs very badly when estimating the coeﬃcient of the lagged de-
pendent variable, which is signiﬁcantly underestimated. On average the bias
ranges from 80 to 100 percent of the true value depending on design. Chinta-
gunta et al (1998) conclude that the conditional logit appears to be the most
robust in estimating the coeﬃcient on the exogenous variables, but produces
poor estimates of the coeﬃcient for the lagged dependent variable. The HK es-
timator produces estimates with small biases, both for the exogenous regressors
and the lagged dependent variable, which makes the HK estimator preferable
when estimating a dynamic model in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity.
Since we have four exogenous and continuous regressors, a bandwidth of the
form hn = h × n− 1
8 is chosen for the HK method, where n denotes the number
of strings (ﬁrms), and h is a positive constant set to 8. Monte Carlo studies by
Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000) with four exogenous continuous variables show
that the cost is not high for introducing additional parameters. The functional
17form for the kernel function K(.) is the multivariate normal density function.
Regarding the bandwidth constant, the Monte Carlos conducted by Honoré and
Kyriazidou (2000) show that the mean absolute error (MAE) decreases as the
bandwidth constant increases. The MAE becomes fairly constant when h is
set to 8 or more. In the Monte Carlos by Chintagunta et al (1998), the HK
estimates show no pattern of bias as the bandwidth increases, and, in general,
the standard deviations of the coeﬃcients decrease as the bandwidth increases.
When Chay and Hyslop (1998) apply the HK estimator, the coeﬃcient-estimates
of the exogenous regressors are sensitive to which bandwidth constant, h,t h a t
is chosen, while the estimate of the state dependence, γ, is insensitive to the
choice of bandwidth constant.3
5D a t a
Data will be used from the database CoSta, which consists of information on
nonﬁnancial companies located in Sweden during the period 1979 to 1996. It
contains information on the income statements and balance sheets of legal en-
tities. More information about CoSta is available in the Appendix. From the
original dataset, the following sample selections have been made. Companies
with less than 20 employees are excluded. Also, companies with a ﬁnancial year
other than twelve months, and companies that are not identical from previous
3Therefore, to show the sensitivity of the results when alternative bandwidth constant are
chosen, we report additional results for the HK method in the Appendix. In Appendix we set
h to 0.5, 2, 5, 20 and 100.
18year, are excluded. We construct a panel of all ﬁrms we can follow through
t h es a m p l ep e r i o d1991-1996. Also, ﬁrms were only included if complete data
were available both for the dependent and the explanatory variables through
the period of estimation. These sample selection result in a total of 13662 ob-
servations, 2277 ﬁrms. Summary statistics for the variables used are given in
table 3.
Table 3: Characteristics of ﬁrms.
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev Min Max
EXT 13662 0.4587908 0.4983171 0 1
DEF 11385 -0.0836438 0.1745284 -1.834095 3.432081
WC 11385 0.2231406 0.2186433 -0.9458874 0.8840445
SALGR 11385 0.083328 0.4493094 -0.998735 29.44143
SIZE 11385 10.93524 1.33547 7.232733 16.09387
The sample mean of frequency in the market for external capital are 2.75
with a standard deviation of 1.63. Table 4 displays this distribution.
Table 4. Frequency in the market for external capital.
Occasions 0 1 2345 6
Frequency 936 2256 3408 3054 1854 966 1188
Table 5 displays the number of ﬁrms seeking external ﬁnancing over the
sample period. It is a fairly even distribution with the lowest value in 1992,
when approximately 43,0 percent of the sample acquired external ﬁnancing, in
contrast to the peak in the initial period 1991 with a percentage of 51,8 percent.
19Table 5. Number of ﬁrms seeking external capital per year
Year 91 92 93 94 95 96
Observations 1179 978 985 1005 1069 1052
Proportion 0.518 0.430 0.433 0.441 0.469 0.462
In this ﬁnal sample there is a low frequency of equity issues. Only 350 obser-
vations, 2.56 percent of the sample, issue equity. External ﬁnance is dominated
by debt. 44.4 percent of the observations have increased their debt stocks by
at least 10 percent during the last year. 154 of the 350 observations that is-
sued equity also raised new debt. A rather large percentage of the sample, 88.0
percent, does invest. These investments must be ﬁnanced internally or exter-
nally. Those ﬁrms who do not invest or have negative investment should have
smaller incentives to seek external ﬁnancing. Table 6 displays the conditional
distribution of investment and ﬁnancing.
Table 6: Conditional distribution of investment and ﬁnancing.
EXT\INVD 1 0 Total
1 0.4071 0.0517 0.4588
0 0.4731 0.0681 0.5412
Total 0.8802 0.1198 1.0
Note: if external ﬁnancing; EXT=1, if positive investments INVD=1.
More than ﬁve percent of the sample seek external ﬁnancing without invest-
ing. One explanation for this phenomenon can be that some of the ﬁrms have
obtained external ﬁnancing at the end of year t and invest in the beginning of
t +1 . Nearly seven percent of the sample do neither obtain external ﬁnancing
20nor invest. The main source of ﬁnancing investments is internally generated
funds. Table 7 displays the pairwise correlation of the included variables.
Table 7: Pairwise correlations, explanatory variables.
Variable EXT DEF WC SALGR SIZE Yt− 1
EXT 1.0000
DEF 0.0194* 1.0000
WC -0.0570* -0.0107 1.0000
SALGR 0.0259* -0.0472* -0.0241* 1.0000
SIZE -0.0169 0.1068* -0.0586* 0.0098 1.0000
EXTt−1 0.2225* 0.1144* 0.0412* 0.0298* 0.0083 1.0000
Note: * signiﬁcance at the 5 percent level or better.
6R e s u l t s
The results are reported in table 8. Models that do not consider unobserved
heterogeneity, both without (ML) and with (MLL) a dynamic structure, are
p r e s e n t e di nc o l u m no n ea n dt w o .I nc o l u m nt h r e ea n df o u ra r et h er e s u l t sf r o m
the conditional likelihood approach, without (CL) and with (CLL) a dynamic
structure presented. The results for the HK-estimator are reported in column
ﬁve. As previously been mentioned, note that of the three models that include
the lagged dependent variable, i.e. MLL, CLL and HK, only the MLL and HK
models provide a consistent estimate of the lagged choice.
21Table 8: Estimation results. Probability to obtain external ﬁnancing.
Model ML MLL CL CLL HK8
DEF 0.2790∗∗ -0.0355 0.6157∗∗∗ 0.8961∗∗∗ 0.1772
(0.1128) (0.1148) (0.1887) (0.1944) (0.1657)
WC -0.5325∗∗∗ -0.6704∗∗∗ -3.4396∗∗∗ -3.2408∗∗∗ -3.8163∗∗∗
(0.0870) (0.0896) (0.2338) (0.2342) (0.2334)
SALGR 0.1599∗∗ 0.0789 0.0098 0.0499 0.1313
(0.0656) (0.0554) (0.0695) (0.0829) (0.0826)
SIZE -0.0360∗∗∗ -0.0392∗∗∗ -1.4826∗∗∗ -1.3852∗∗∗ -1.2972∗∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0146) (0.1270) (0.1276) (0.1171)




n4 11385 11385 88158 8 155 3 2 1
Timedummies Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Notes: ∗∗∗,∗∗,∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 1,5 ,a n d10 percent level, respectively.
Standard errors are inside parentheses. In HK8 the bandwidth constant h is set to 8.
4The diﬀerent estimation techniques have diﬀerent restrictions on which observations that
contribute to the likelihood function. The methods that have the lagged choice as an explana-
tory variable, MLL, CLL and HK, use only the initial value of the dependent variable from
the ﬁrst year of the path. The models that do not include the lag, CL and ML, do not use the
initial information of each path. Further, the conditional likelihood methods, CL and CLL,
o n l yu s eo b s e r v a t i o n sw i t ha tl e a s to n es w i t c ha f t e rt h ei n i t i a lv a l u e .O n l yt h e s eo b s e r v a t i o n s
contribute to the likelihood function. The HK estimator is the most restrictive, considering
only observations with switches in the middle four periods giving an eﬀective string length of
T − 2.
22Consistent with the pecking order theory, the expected cash deﬁcit (DEF)
has a positive impact on the probability of obtaining capital externally. How-
ever, when the lagged dependent variable is included in the model and consis-
tently estimated, i.e. in the MLL and HK models, the coeﬃcient is no longer
signiﬁcant. In the previous studies, Helwege and Liang (1996) do not receive a
signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the expected cash deﬁcit, while De Haan and Hinloopen
(1999) do, as expected, receive a signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient.
The stock of working capital (WC) is negatively related to the possibility of
obtaining external ﬁnancing, and is signiﬁcant in all models at the one percent
signiﬁcance level. This is consistent with the pecking order theory, indicating
that ﬁrms prefer internal ﬁnancing and substitute external ﬁnancing against
ﬁnancial slack. This result is consistent with De Haan and Hinloopen’s (1999),
who measure ﬁnancial slack as the ratio of liquid assets to total assets. However,
when adding ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects, the coeﬃcient changes from about -0.6 in, ML
and MLL, to over -3 in the CL, CLL, and the HK. The same pattern can be
recognized for the coeﬃcient for ﬁrm size (SIZE), which also changes dramati-
cally when adding ﬁrm-speciﬁce ﬀects. This indicates that these two variables
are correlated with some unobserved characteristics, resulting in upward biased
results in the models assuming homogeneity.
In contrast to previous studies, i.e. Helwege and Liang (1996), De Haan
and Hinloopen (1999), and Klein and Belt (1993), which all ﬁnd a positive
relationship between ﬁrms’ size and the possibility of external ﬁnancing, larger
23ﬁrms are less probable to seek external ﬁnancing. This diﬀerence can be due
to the fact that previous studies ignore unobserved heterogeneity, which in this
sample gives upward biased results. Another diﬀerence is that previous studies
focus on publicly listed companies, while this sample contains a larger variety of
companies. It is possible that, for any given level of expected deﬁcit, a smaller
ﬁrm have more ﬂeeting investment opportunities relative to their capital stock.
The coeﬃcient for the lagged dependent variable is signiﬁcant at the one
percent signiﬁcance level in all models with a dynamic structure, i.e. MLL,
CLL, and HK. A negative sign on the coeﬃcient of lagged choice would imply
that there are higher costs associated with external ﬁnancing than possible
beneﬁts of repeatedly obtaining external ﬁnancing. In that case, when entering
the capital markets, ﬁrms would rather acquire more capital than needed than
smooth ﬁnancing over time. A positive sign indicates the existence of positive
side eﬀects associated with repeatedly being in the market for external capital.
These reduce the costs of the information asymmetry between management and
ﬁnanciers.
In both models that consistently estimate the lagged dependent variable, i.e.
MLL and HK, the coeﬃcient is positive at the one percent signiﬁcance level.
In the MLL model, the positive eﬀect of the previous ﬁnancing variable is 0.94.
However, introducing heterogeneity as in the HK model lowers it substantially
to 0.34. Thus, the MLL ignore possible heterogeneity, which introduce spurious
state dependence, giving upward biased results. In contrast to the two models
24that consistently estimate the lagged dependent variable, the CLL estimator
estimate the coeﬃcient for the lagged dependent variable negative at the one
percent signiﬁcance level. The fact that maximum likelihood estimators produce
biased estimates of the lagged choice in models with both ﬁxed eﬀects and a
lagged dependent variable is well documented [e.g. Heckman (1981a)]. This is
also supported by the results from the Monte Carlo simulations by Chintagunta
et al (1999), which show that the conditional likelihood estimator with ﬁxed
eﬀects underestimate the coeﬃcient for the lagged choice.
A drawback with the HK estimator is that it does not allow for timedummies.
The four other methods have been estimated including timedummies in table
8. For comparable reasons, we have also estimated these estimators without
timedummies. Table 10 in the Appendix reports these additional results. These
show that the results are not particularly sensitive to the inclusion of timedum-
mies. Also, to show the sensitivity of the results from the HK model to which
bandwidth constant that are chosen, we estimated the HK model with several
bandwidth constants. Table 11 in the Appendix reports these additional results,
which show that only the coeﬃcient for the expected cash deﬁcit is sensitive to
the choice of bandwidth constant.
Finally, we turn to the economic implications of the point estimate for
the state dependence. Since the lagged choice is discrete, we calculate semi-









1+( eγ − 1)Πit
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where Πit is the probability that external ﬁnancing is acquired. We calculate
semi-elasticities for the MLL and HK8 at three diﬀerent probabilities, Πit =
0.25, 0.5, 0.75. These probabilities correspond to ﬁxing xitˆ β+αi to -1.1,0 ,a n d
1.1, respectively.
Table 9: Economic importance, lagged choice
Estimator \ Π0 0.25 0.50 0.75
Π1
ΠMLL
1 0.4592 0.7184 0.9292
ΠHK8
1 0.3400 0.5832 0.8268
Changes in probability
∆ΠMLL 0.2092 0.2184 0.1346
∆ΠHK8 0.0678 0.0832 0.0594
Semi-elasticities
MLL 0.8382 0.4368 0.1792
HK8 0.2722 0.1664 0.0768
Note: ∆Π = Π1 − Π0,w h e r eΠ0(Π|yit−1 =0 ) ,a n dΠ1(Π|yit−1 =1 ) .
From the elasticities in table 9, we note that the lagged choice has a strong
inﬂuence on the external ﬁnancing choice in both estimation methods. Having
acquired external capital in the previous period increases the probability of ac-
26quiring external ﬁnancing again from 0.50 to approximately 0.58 using the HK8
estimate and to 0.72 using the MLL estimate. By not including ﬁxed eﬀects, the
importance of the lagged choice more than double. Thus, the economic impor-
tance of the lagged choice is overstated in the MLL estimate by the presence of
”spurious state dependence”. However, from the HK estimate we can conclude
that a ﬁrm currently acquiring external ﬁnancing is more likely to do so again
in the next period in the sense of ”true state dependence”.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
This study has examined the dynamic process underlying ﬁrms’ discrete exter-
nal ﬁnancing choice, and possible explanations for why a smoothing of ﬁnancing
previously has been found. Previous studies focusing on ﬁrms’ discrete external
ﬁnancing decision ﬁnd a smoothing of ﬁnancing, but ignore unobserved het-
erogeneity. Without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, this dependence
can either be of a ”true” nature or an eﬀect of ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics that
we cannot observe. Introducing heterogeneity, as in the HK model, lowers the
degree of the dependence. Thus, ignoring possible heterogeneity, introduces
spurious state dependence giving upward biased results.
After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity we still ﬁnd a smoothing of
ﬁnancing, and also that unobserved heterogeneity plays a signiﬁcant explana-
tory role. The presence of ”spurious state dependence” makes us overstate the
27importance of the lagged choice. The increase in the probability of acquir-
ing external ﬁnancing of acquired external ﬁnancing in the previous period is
more than twice as large than when including ﬁxed eﬀects. However, even after
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, ﬁrms that acquire external capital is
approximately 6 to 8 percentage more likely to do so again in the next period.
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318 Appendix
8.1 Additional results
Table 10: Estimation results without timedummies.
Model ML MLL CL CLL
DEF 0.2653∗∗ -0.0689 0.4058∗∗ 0.7072∗∗∗
(0.1114) (0.1136) (0.1813) (0.1877)
WC -0.5220∗∗∗ -0.6554∗∗∗ -3.2013∗∗∗ -3.002∗∗∗
(0.0869) (0.0894) (0.2292) (0.2295)
SALGR 0.1823∗∗∗ 0.1059∗ 0.0702 0.1213
(0.0661) (0.0554) (0.0801) (0.0888)
SIZE -0.0331∗∗∗ -0.0358∗∗ -0.9885∗∗∗ -0.9003∗∗∗





n 11385 11385 88158 8 15
Timedummies No No No No
Note: ***,**,* denotes signiﬁcant at the 1,5a n d10 percent level respectively.
Standard errors are inside parentheses.
32Table 11: Estimation results for the HK estimator. Diﬀerent bandwidths
Model HK05 HK2 HK5 HK20 HK100
DEF 1.7300*** 0.4142** 0.2103 0.1559 0.1530
(0.307) (0.173) (0.166) (0.166) (0.166)
WC -5.5512*** -4.0465*** -3.8310*** -3.8116*** 3.8046***
(0.408) (0.2404) (0.233) (0.234) (0.234)
SALGR -0.0604 0.1230 0.1363 0.1229 0.1216
(0.177) (0.090) (0.084) (0.082) (0.082)
SIZE -2.9897*** -1.5784*** -1.3414*** -1.2680*** -1.2646***
(0.249) (0.126) (0.118) (0.116) (0.116)
EXTt−1 0.3173*** 0.3343*** 0.3353 *** 0.3371*** 0.3387***
(0.056) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Note: ***,**,* denotes signiﬁcant at the 1,5 ,a n d10 percent level respectively.
Standard errors are inside parentheses. HK05, HK2, HK5, HK20 and HK100 denotes
bandwidth constants of 0.5, 2, 5, 20 and 100 respectively.
8.2 CoSta
CoSta is administrated at the Department of Economics, Uppsala University,
Sweden. The database is constructed mainly by an extract from Enterprises -
Financial Accounts but also by The Corporate Group Register, which are both
collected from Statistics Sweden. CoSta contains only corporations, economic
associations, trading companies, limited partnerships and foundations. Compa-
nies that have income less than 50.000 SEK are excluded and also companies in
33real estate management, ISIC 7. CoSta covers corporations and economic as-
sociations during the period 1979 to 1996. Companies owned by municipalities
and also companies in the farming sector, ISIC 1 are excluded. Furthermore,
for the period 1979 to 1983, only companies in the business services, ISIC 832,
within ﬁnancing, insurance, real estate and business services, ISIC 8, and com-
panies in the personal and household services, ISIC 95, within community, social
and personal services, ISIC 9, are included in CoSta. For the period 1984 to
1996 companies in CoSta that belongs to a corporate group are identiﬁed and
selected information from The Corporate Group Register is added. Information
on corporate group aﬃliation, and the state as a corporate group mother or a
daughter is available for these companies.[Hansen (1999)]
8.3 Deﬁnition of variables
The variables used are deﬁn e da si nH a n s e n( 1999). The ﬁrms operating earnings
before depreciation is deﬁned as:
OPEARit = Va r011it
Investment is a measure of spending on machinery, equipment and business
structures. It also takes into account assets acquired through takeovers, net of
assets sold.
E(Iit)=Iit−1 = Va r115it−1 + Va r 119it−1 − Va r127it−1 + Va r116it−1
+Va r 120it−1 − Va r128it−1 + Va r117it−1 + Va r121it−1 − Va r 129it−1
34where the investment dummy (INVD) takes the value of one if Iit > 0,
otherwise zero.
Sales growth is deﬁned as:
SALGRit=
Va r 005it−Va r 005it−1
Va r005it−1
The ﬁrm is seeking external ﬁnance if the long-term debt stock, net of pension
provisions, has grown with at least 10 percent.
(Va r 088it−Va r 85it)−(Va r088it−1−Va r 085it−1)
Va r088it−1−Va r085it−1
o ri fn e we q u i t yi si s s u e d ,V a r 112it > 0
Working capital (WC)i sd e ﬁned as total current assets net of total current
liabilities, denominated with total assets
WCit =
Va r063it−1−Va r 083it−1
Va r 077it−1
Dividends (DIV) are expressed in percentage of total assets.
E(DIVt)=DIVit−1 = Va r111it−1
35